

CHAPTER XXXII

THE EVACUATION OF HELLES

(Map 6 ; Sketches 33, 33A)

FROM the early days of December one of the greatest anxieties Dec. which crowded upon General Birdwood was the future question Map 6. of the adequate protection of Helles—even as a temporary measure—after the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac had been completed.

If the position were going to be held for any length of time it would be essential to increase the garrison, and (in view of the chances of bad weather) to build up a large reserve of ammunition, supplies and stores. An opposite course would be desirable if the evacuation of Helles was to follow at an early date. Yet for the moment the only instruction from home was the vague order that Helles "was to be held for the present", and the future policy of the Government was inscrutable. Meanwhile many of the units of the VIII Corps were badly in need of rest, and the French Government were seeking to withdraw the whole of their contingent—artillery as well as infantry—at the earliest possible moment.

The withdrawal of the French batteries would be a very serious blow. They had an intimate knowledge of the Turkish positions opposite to them; they were well provided with ammunition; and their disappearance, in addition to reducing the defensive strength of the line, would induce the Turks to believe that evacuation was imminent.

To meet the wishes of the French, the whole of their Senegalese infantry was withdrawn from the peninsula between the 12th and 22nd December, though this could only be done by making a fresh call upon the 29th Division. The exigencies of the situation had made it necessary to send back that highly tried division to Helles immediately after the evacuation of Suvla,¹ and by

¹ The state of the 86th Brigade, which returned to Helles on the 16th, can be judged from the following letter from the brigade-major, written at Mudros on the 15th December, and addressed to the D.A.A.G., G.H.Q. :

Dec. Christmas Eve it was once again holding its old position on the southern front, with all its brigades in the line.

On this date, the 24th December, the only French infantry remaining on the peninsula was a French Colonial brigade, holding a small section of the line on the extreme right. Fortunately, at the urgent request of the War Office, the French had agreed that, for the present at least, the whole of their artillery could be retained.

General Birdwood's intention at this time was to send away the French Colonial brigade early in January, but before doing so it was essential to relieve the 42nd Division, which imperatively needed rest. He also wanted to pull out the 29th Division as soon as possible, and had decided, with General Monro's concurrence,¹ that, if Helles were to be retained, the position should eventually be held by the 11th, 13th and 52nd Divisions, with the 42nd and Royal Naval Divisions in reserve on adjacent islands.

Though throughout the month of November opinions had widely differed as to the wisdom of abandoning the Dardanelles campaign, naval and military opinion on the spot was already unanimous that an attempt to retain Helles by itself would be

"As I have been informed by the M.L.O. that this brigade is under orders to go to Helles to-morrow, I beg to bring the following facts to notice. (1) I am the only representative of the brigade staff here, the brigadier and remainder of staff having been left to complete the embarkation at Suvla. (2) I am also temporarily commanding the brigade. (3) This brigade lost very heavily in the recent storm, and is now under 1,400 strong with only 4 regular officers (the senior a temporary major), and a large number of the men have not yet recovered from their late hardships in the storm. (4) There are very few N.C.O.'s and practically no battalion staffs at all. In my opinion, and I know it is the opinion of the brigadier, the brigade is badly in need of reorganizing, when after a short time, I feel sure it would again be an efficient fighting unit. At present it is not. (5) At present also the officers have nothing but what they stand up in, having lost everything in the floods. (6) The brigade equipment is practically nil (telephones, tools, etc.)."

¹ Immediately after the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac the Government decided upon a reorganization of the commands in the Mediterranean. On 21st December General Monro received orders to return to France to command the First Army. General Birdwood was to remain in command at the Dardanelles "so long as Helles is held". Sir Archibald Murray was coming out from home to command the Canal defences, and would also have supervision of Helles and Salonika, with his headquarters in "Egypt". On 23rd December Monro informed the War Office that he would sail for home on the 26th, and, pending Murray's arrival, would hand over to Birdwood. But this message crossed one from Lord Kitchener cancelling the order for his immediate return, telling him to remain in his existing command until General Murray's arrival in Egypt, and adding that, till Murray's arrival, his headquarters should be located "wherever he thought best". For the present, therefore, General Monro decided to remain at Mudros.

a costly and worthless undertaking. General Davies, it is true, Dec. at a moment when the destruction of his piers had led him to look upon evacuation as the greater risk of the two, had asserted that it would be possible to hold his position throughout the winter months; and Admiral de Robeck, before proceeding home on leave, had suggested that the retention of Helles would help the fleet to blockade the mouth of the Straits. But Admiral Wemyss and Commodore Keyes were both convinced that the inevitable military losses at Helles would far outweigh any advantages which the fleet might gain from its retention,¹ and ever since the 8th December General Birdwood as well as General Monro had been in favour of abandoning the position at the earliest possible moment after the withdrawal from Suvla and Anzac was complete.² Not only would the Turks be able to increase the strength of their artillery at the southern end of the peninsula; but the weather in the middle of January might well destroy the last chance of a successful embarkation. From the 20th December onward, therefore, a statement of the Government's policy with regard to Helles was awaited with impatience and very real anxiety.

Much of this anxiety was due to the fact that any preparations for remaining on the peninsula, such as the landing of more troops, ammunition and stores, would be antagonistic to the preliminaries for a successful withdrawal. For this reason alone an early decision by the Government was a really vital necessity.

Another reason for anxiety on the part of the higher commanders was the knowledge that for the regimental officers and men the uncertainty of the situation, and the grimness of their own outlook were utterly depressing. With the news of the withdrawal from Suvla and Anzac there arose amongst the Helles garrison the inevitable feeling that the campaign had been a

¹ In point of fact Admiral Wemyss even up to 13th December had not given up hope that the situation might still be saved in the Dardanelles, and defeat turned into victory, by the fleet forcing the Straits. On 13th December he had wired to the Admiralty that, in his opinion, the Helles position would be untenable unless Achi Baba was captured, and that if a new military attack on Achi Baba was decided upon he could, with the help of 15 miles of anti-torpedo netting which he had recently arrived, give the army very powerful naval support. Then, with Achi Baba in our possession, "the attack on the Narrows could be carried out with every hope of success". But on hearing that, in the opinion of Sir Charles Monro and all the military authorities on the spot, the capture of Achi Baba was not a practical undertaking with the forces at their disposal, Admiral Wemyss became equally insistent upon the advisability of the early evacuation of Helles.


² Sir Charles Monro had twice informed Lord Kitchener that from a purely military point of view he regarded the retention of Helles only as a lesser evil than the retention of all three positions.

Dec. fiasco, that their casualties and hardships had all been suffered in vain, and that they were fighting for a dead cause.

To General Davies, in command of the VIII Corps, it was abundantly plain that whether the orders he received were to go or to stay, the only chance of carrying them out successfully was to keep the whip-hand of the Turks by constant offensive action. Emphatic orders were therefore issued to his divisions for the offensive to be maintained on all occasions and at every practicable point in the line. The Turks were to be driven from their trenches by trench mortars, catapults and grenades, and the British line pushed forward by sapping, by mining and by the seizure and consolidation of important points.

The troops for whom these orders were issued were for the most part tired men—physically weary, and morally disillusioned. Yet their response to this exacting call was remarkable, and throughout the course of the Gallipoli campaign there was nothing finer than the spirit displayed by units of the VIII Corps engaged in the minor enterprises during the last weeks of their occupation of the peninsula. Every condition at this period was in favour of the Turks. The British acknowledgment of failure by withdrawing from Anzac and Suvla was a lever to raise their morale. There were ample reserves to reinforce their lines. More and more artillery was being hurried south; and more ammunition was available than at any previous period. Yet, thanks to the endeavours of the British garrison, the Turkish infantry remained completely subdued. Strenuous efforts were made by the Turkish command to insist on a forward policy, and to keep watch over the invaders' movements by greater patrolling activity and by launching a series of attacks on the British line. But these efforts were vain. The moral ascendancy remained with the VIII Corps, and it was to the splendid spirit of the various battalions concerned that the success of the eventual evacuation was very largely due.

General Birdwood had early decided that, if evacuation were ordered, it should be carried out, as at Suvla and Anzac, in three stages. Realizing, however, the extreme difficulty of hoodwinking the Turks a second time, he had decided by the 20th December that the only chance of success at Helles would be to complete the final stage in a single night. The forward trenches must be held in strength to the end, and the last garrison must withdraw in one bound from the front line to the boats. Redoubled care would have to be taken in the preliminary and intermediate stages to preserve the normal appearance of the beaches and back areas, and for the artillery to maintain its normal expenditure of ammunition.



Imperial War Museum Photo.

W BEACH, HELLES, IN JANUARY 1916

A shell from the Asiatic shore bursting beside the main pier

Crown Copyright.

It was at this juncture, while the Helles garrison was Dec. anxiously awaiting the news of its fate, that, on the 23rd December, Sir William Robertson replaced General Murray as Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Convinced that there was nothing to gain and very much to lose by attempting to remain at Helles, he was already pressing for immediate evacuation, and there was every chance that his views would be adopted.

Before accepting office General Robertson had insisted that all orders to commanders in the field should in future be issued by him, and not, as heretofore, by the War Secretary, and it was in pursuance of this return to more normal methods, and in anticipation of the Government's decision to evacuate, that on the 24th December he telegraphed his first instructions to General Monro. In this message he authorized Monro to make all preparations for an immediate evacuation. Nothing, however, was yet to be done which would prejudice the safety of the position if the Government eventually decided to hold on. These instructions were repeated to General Birdwood at Imbros.

Though this message was completely non-committal, its psychological effect was of the utmost value to its recipients; it showed that their interests were being watched at home and their difficulties understood. It furnished a valuable hint of the probable direction of the wind, and enabled the Commander-in-Chief to issue orders for the preliminary stage of evacuation to begin.

The following morning—Christmas Day—General Birdwood visited Helles, and after a conference with General Davies and General Brulard, commanding the French contingent, it was decided that, in order to obviate the disadvantages of divided command in the final stage, the French infantry should be relieved as early as possible. In addition, General Brulard cordially agreed—though not without some anxiety as to the view which his Government might take of his acquiescence—that all the French artillery should be left behind under the orders of the VIII Corps and withdrawn with the British guns. It was pointed out to him that it would almost certainly be impossible to embark all the heavy guns, and that some must be destroyed and abandoned. To this he also agreed without demur.

General Davies was ordered to prepare a draft scheme of evacuation, and, to assist in this work, Captain J. F. S. D. Coleridge of the 11th Division staff, and two other officers who had specially distinguished themselves in the northern operations, were temporarily attached to corps headquarters.

Dec. Subject to the conditions that the front-line trenches must be held in strength till the last, and that the final stage must be completed in one night, General Davies was given a free hand in framing his tactical plan.

In view of the possibility of an early evacuation, it was now decided that the 42nd Division and its attached troops should be evacuated at the earliest moment and replaced by the 13th Division. But the arrangements for the relief of the 29th Division were cancelled, the corps commander urging that, though few of its original personnel were left, it was still the most trustworthy of all the formations under his command, and that he would like to keep it to the end. In accordance with this decision, the 13th Division (less the 38th Brigade) began to move from Mudros to Helles on the evening of the 26th and gradually relieved the 42nd Division (with the South-Eastern Mounted Brigade attached) on the left of the British line. Arrangements were also made at this time that, as soon as definite orders to evacuate were received, the Royal Naval Division should take over the remaining section of the French line at the mouth of Kereves Dere, and that the VIII Corps front should thereafter be held to the end by the 12th (less one brigade), 29th, 52nd and Royal Naval Divisions in that order from left to right.

Thanks to the hard work of the Royal Engineers and the labour parties working under them, very good progress had been made in the repair of the piers on W Beach, and from Christmas Day onwards the evacuation of animals and material not likely to be wanted in the winter—even if the position were retained—was pressed steadily forward.

The guiding principle of evacuation in the northern zone had been to withdraw, during the intermediate stage, all personnel and material surplus to the minimum requirements for the defence of the existing positions during a spell of bad weather which might easily last for a week; and then, on the first convenient opportunity, to withdraw this final garrison in two consecutive nights. The pier facilities at Anzac and Suvla had been just sufficient to enable the navy to conform to this tactical plan. In the case of Helles, General Birdwood was of opinion that the final garrison should similarly be strong enough to hold the existing position during a week of bad weather; but, as already pointed out, owing to the increasing chance of sudden gales and the undoubted difficulty of hoodwinking the Turks a second time, he was convinced that the final stage should be completed in a single night. On going into figures with the navy, however, it was discovered that the largest

number of troops they could embark in one night was 15,000. Dec. This figure, therefore, and not the numbers required to hold the position for a week, was now the ruling factor. On the 27th December this information was forwarded to General Davies, and he was ordered to restrict his final garrison to 15,000 men. He was informed that the navy could supply sufficient shipping to complete his intermediate stage in seven nights.

Preparation had gone thus far when, on the 28th December, definite news at last arrived from home in a telegram from the C.I.G.S.:

The Government have decided that the Cape Helles position may now be evacuated. The withdrawal should be carried out as soon as practicable, but at your complete discretion.

General Davies was thereupon instructed to begin the intermediate stage.

On the following morning General Birdwood and his senior General Staff officer attended a conference at G.H.Q., where Sir Charles Monro explained his wishes as to the general principles to be observed in completing the evacuation. Speed would be of first importance, and, owing to the chance of bad weather, he was anxious that lives should not be unduly risked by attempting too much in the way of saving material. At the same time he hoped that, as far as possible, all the more valuable guns and howitzers might be saved, and all the howitzer ammunition. He reiterated General Birdwood's original instructions to the VIII Corps, which, for naval reasons, had since been found to be a counsel of unattainable perfection—that while the troops left for the final stage should be strong enough to hold the position during a spell of bad weather, they should all be embarked in the course of one night. All details of the plan, however, were left to General Birdwood. He would be given a free hand in the conduct of the operation, and in concerting measures with the Admiral for the necessary naval support.

On returning to Imbros that evening General Birdwood learnt that General Davies was of opinion that he could not resist attack on his existing positions during a prolonged spell of rough weather with a smaller garrison than 22,000 men and 60 guns, and that it would be a lesser evil to spread his final stage over two nights than to reduce his final garrison below that figure. In these circumstances, Birdwood provisionally agreed that the final stage should be spread over two nights: 7,000 men and 40 guns to be embarked on the first night, and

Dec. 15,000 men and as many as possible of the remaining 20 guns on the final night.

General Birdwood had already been told that the evacuation of the French contingent, other than the guns to be left in British care, must be completed by the 6th January. After conferring with the naval authorities, he decided that the VIII Corps intermediate stage must be finished by the morning of the 8th January, and that, weather permitting, the final stage should begin the following night.

Some disturbing but not unexpected news arrived from Helles on the evening of the 29th December. A Turkish deserter, giving himself up that day, reported that his battalion had received orders for small parties to be continually pushed forward to the British lines, to see if they were still occupied.

Throughout this trying period, the VIII Corps continued to maintain, by bombing, sniping and minor operations, the moral ascendancy it had established over the enemy. On the 29th the 52nd Division completed the capture of the G11 line by seizing all portions of that trench which still remained in Turkish hands, and held them successfully in face of counter-attacks. Nevertheless the Turkish shelling of the beaches and back area was gradually increasing in frequency and intensity, and the average daily casualties in the corps had risen in the past week from 30 to 84.

General Davies's scheme for evacuation was approved by General Birdwood on the 30th December, and his initial instructions to divisions were issued the same day. Profiting by the lessons learnt at Anzac and Suvla, he adopted, and in some cases improved upon, the arrangements which had proved successful at those places, and his instructions, drafted by Br.-General H. E. Street, were issued to divisions in a series of very precise and clear memoranda.

From the point of view of the naval embarkation staff, one disadvantage of the Anzac scheme had been the three changes in the higher military command at three stages of the withdrawal. To obviate this disadvantage, General Davies had decided to form an embarkation zone, distinct from the fighting zone, on entry into which all troops would come under the orders of a special commander, who would remain ashore till the last. Major-General Hon. H. A. Lawrence, commanding the 52nd Division, was selected for this appointment with a strong staff, and a subordinate commander in charge of each beach.¹

¹ Lieut.-Colonel H. L. N. Beynon, who had rendered valuable service in the evacuation of Suvla, was appointed chief assistant to General Lawrence.

As the Helles position lay open like a large scale map to Dec. Turkish observers on the Asiatic coast as well as on Achi Baba, General Davies drew particular attention to the importance of maintaining normal appearances throughout the intermediate stage. Traffic on the roads was to be kept to its normal volume; dumps of stores were to be emptied from the centre and the holes covered with tarpaulins; all fires were to be kept burning, and no tents to be struck.

As regards the actual method of withdrawal, each division ^{Sketches} in line was to maintain its existing front-line trenches to the ^{33, 33A.} end, the final garrison on the last day to consist of about two-thirds of its normal strength in rifles and machine guns. On the last day the support line and the Eski Line were to be held by small groups at special points, and a fourth line of posts (to be selected forthwith) was to be established on the general line de Tott's, Zimmerman's Farm, Gully Beach. In rear of this fourth line each division was to mark out a special rendezvous, where the retiring troops would be collected prior to being marched down to the forming-up places adjoining the beach. On arrival at the forming-up places all troops were to come under the orders of the embarkation command, who would be responsible for moving them down in formed bodies to the boats.

Positions to cover the beaches were to be selected and garrisoned beforehand, as also a final position, immediately above each beach, where a few rifles could prevent the enemy—in case of the final withdrawal being closely followed—from firing into the boats before embarkation was complete. All communication trenches not to be used on the final night were to be blocked, and those to be used were to be very carefully marked. Control posts in the various lines of defence were to report to the rear when the last troops from the front had passed through, and then to close the gaps, reel up the telephones, and retire. As at Anzac, devices were to be used for firing rifles and bombs in the front line after the last troops had gone.

The gradual reduction of guns was to be brought about first by the removal of the majority of heavy guns and howitzers, and then by the reduction of each field battery from four guns to two, and finally to a single gun. It was decided to retain and finally destroy one British 6-inch gun and six old heavy French guns, which it would be impossible to withdraw on the last night.¹

Br. General J. W. O'Dowda and Colonel D. F. MacCarthy-Morrogh were placed in military charge at W and V Beaches respectively.

¹ General Brulard himself suggested the destruction of these old and nearly worthless guns.

Dec. The normal expenditure of ammunition was at once to be reduced to what could be kept up by the guns remaining on the peninsula on the final night.

In a similar manner the action of the infantry, both as regards rifle fire and bombing, was to be so organized that from the 30th December onwards all firing would normally cease at midnight¹—the hour at which the trenches would be finally evacuated on the last night. But enemy action after midnight was to be met with a vigorous reply.

On the 31st December General Birdwood was again summoned to Mudros, and was able to assure the Commander-in-Chief that the combined naval and military plans for the evacuation were already nearly complete. The following day Sir Charles Monro and his staff left for Cairo, where G.H.Q. was in future to be established.² Before leaving, he instructed General Birdwood to send him a daily progress report to Egypt, and, on the conclusion of the evacuation, a brief summary of the operation for transmission to the Secretary of State for War.

Jan. On the 1st January the French Colonial brigade was relieved
1916. on the right of the line by units of the Royal Naval Division. In the course of the next two nights the last of the French troops, other than the batteries to remain to the end, were embarked by the French fleet, and the whole position at Helles then came under the undivided command of General Davies.

The progress of the intermediate stage at Helles was far more handicapped than at Anzac and Suvla by accident and bad weather. Not only were the French unable, in the limited time at their disposal, to send away more than a fractional part of the vast quantities of stores which they had accumulated on V Beach, but on one occasion, by sheer bad luck, the French battleship *Suffren* collided with and sank the large British transport *St. Oswald*, which had just arrived at Helles to embark a thousand mules; and from the beginning of the New Year the embarkation of material was seriously delayed, and frequently interrupted for many hours together, by a succession of high winds.

¹ As "jumpiness" on the part of the Allies continually led to unnecessary fire being opened at various parts of the line throughout the night this latter plan was probably not very effective.

² See page 462. Telegraphing to the C.I.G.S. on 31st December, General Monro reported: "I have completed arrangements for the evacuation of Helles at a final conference with the Vice-Admiral and Birdwood. . . . As I can do nothing further here, I shall leave to-morrow for Alexandria."

Admiral de Robeck returned from leave on 31st December, and resumed command of the fleet.

By the 4th January it was plain that either the final stage must be postponed, or large numbers of animals and vast quantities of French and British material destroyed and abandoned to the enemy. Of these two alternatives General Birdwood unhesitatingly chose the latter, as every day's delay would lessen the chance of withdrawing from the peninsula without a heavy loss of personnel. Jan. 1916.

On the 5th the weather looked so threatening that General Davies repented of his request to retain a final garrison of such a size as would require two calm nights for its withdrawal. It was consequently decided to appeal to the fleet to find some way of embarking a somewhat larger number than 15,000 men in one night, and to reduce the final garrison to whatever that number might be. This final garrison could then be withdrawn on the first fine night after the completion of the intermediate stage.

The navy's previous estimate had been based on the time required to embark troops in motor-lighters and then to transfer them to ships lying off the coast. But at a joint naval and military conference, attended by Commodore Keyes and Captain Staveley,¹ it was now calculated that by carrying out certain work on the breakwaters² at V Beach, and by connecting a small sunken caïlier at Helles by a floating bridge to the stone pier to which it acted as a breakwater, it would be possible to embark a large number of troops direct into destroyers and troop-carriers, and thus to deal on the last night with 17,000 men in addition to embarking a large number of guns. Captain E. Matthews, R.E., who had been employed for some time on the rebuilding of the Helles piers, offered many helpful suggestions with regard to their improvement, and guaranteed that the necessary work should be done. General Davies agreed that a garrison of 17,000 men with 54 guns would give him a reasonable chance of holding out, if necessary, for several days, and, with the Army commander's concurrence, it was thereupon decided that the Helles force should be reduced to this strength by the morning of the 8th, that all stores remaining on the peninsula on that date should be prepared for destruction, and that the final withdrawal of personnel and guns should be completed on the first subsequent night of fine weather. Of the 54 guns to be kept to the last, seventeen had now been marked

¹ Captain Staveley, who had been in naval charge of the beach during the evacuation of Anzac, had been detailed in a similar capacity to Helles. Commander Mulock, who had been at Suvla, was to work, under Staveley's orders, in naval charge at V Beach.

² Two large obsolete French men-of-war had been sunk as breakwaters at V Beach by the French.

Jan. 1916. for destruction; of the remaining 37, as many were to be embarked as could be got away without specially hazarding the lives of the troops.

By the morning of the 7th the Helles garrison had been reduced to about 19,000 men and 63 guns. Apart from hostile aeroplane activity and a slight increase of shelling, the enemy had shown little enterprise, and hopes were running high that he was still unaware that evacuation was in progress. There could be no room for doubt that he was expecting an attempt at withdrawal. But every morning the British ships clearing the beaches had disappeared before daylight; the British trenches were still held in strength; and except by means of a successful attack, the Turks could not discover that nearly half the opposing garrison had already left the peninsula.

It is now known from the memoirs of Liman von Sanders that, having failed to crush the IX and Anzac Corps in the course of their evacuation, he was determined not to fail a second time. The German commander was convinced that the British would not try to use Helles as a base for further operations. But he thought that they might try to remain there for some time longer before withdrawing, and this, he adds, "could not be permitted". On the very morning after the Suvla evacuation, therefore, he despatched his best batteries from the abandoned front to Helles, as well as the best scouts; and plans were set on foot for an early attack on the whole southern front by a force composed of all his best divisions. Meanwhile the Turkish troops in the south "were cautioned again and again to watch attentively for any indication of withdrawal", and bridges were everywhere placed in readiness to enable the Turkish artillery to be rushed forward in pursuit.

As a prelude to his main attack, Liman von Sanders arranged that the specially trained *12th Division* should carry out the preliminary operation of straightening the Turkish line by driving in the salient on Gully Spur. This attack was fixed for the 7th January. "after two hours of preparation by the heaviest artillery fire and the explosion of mines".¹

The plan was certainly beyond reproach, but an all-important factor of success was missing. Even with the support of a greatly increased artillery, the best-trained Turkish troops on the peninsula, though still admirable in defence, could not be relied on to go forward in attack.

This was the situation when about midday on the 7th, following a period of profound quiet, a violent bombardment

¹ "Fünf Jahre Türkei", pp. 130-32.

was opened on the front of the 13th Division on Gully Spur, Jan. and, from the Asiatic shore, on the extreme right of the line. ^{1916.} Soon afterwards the 13th Division called for artillery support, and owing to the weakness of the VIII Corps artillery, the navy was asked to help. At three o'clock the enemy's fire on the 13th Division was becoming really severe. Much damage had been done to the parapets, communications were cut, and it seemed almost certain that he meant to attack in force. The few troops in reserve stood to arms, supports were hurried forward, and at Imbros a brigade of the 11th Division was held in immediate readiness to be rushed across to the peninsula.

At four o'clock the Turks exploded two mines on Gully Spur. Their trenches began to bristle with bayonets, and their officers could be seen making frantic efforts to induce the men to assault. But the fire of the British garrison, ably supported by the warships on the left flank, was so accurate that the Turks would not budge. Only at two points near Fusilier Bluff were half-hearted attacks delivered, and these were repulsed by the 7/North Staffordshire with very heavy loss. But not until five o'clock did the enemy's bombardment finally die away, and it was described by the old hands in the division as the heaviest shelling they had ever seen on the peninsula. Thanks to the good cover available in the British line, the casualties were smaller than expected. But the 7/North Staffordshire had suffered considerably, including the loss of its commanding officer (Lieut.-Colonel F. H. Walker) killed, and the total casualties amounted to 164.

This inopportune activity on the part of the Turks added not a little to the anxiety of the VIII Corps in the critical hours that followed. Fortunately, however, the enemy made no further effort to test the strength of the line; there was less shelling than usual on the Helles beaches that night; and it is now known that the vigour of the British resistance had persuaded the Turkish commanders that, whatever the future might hold, there was no immediate thought of evacuation. During the course of the attack there had been no lack of British artillery ammunition, and the powerful and well-directed fire of the *Edgar* (Captain D. L. Dent) and *Wolverine* (Lieut.-Commander A. Keyes) did much to disguise the diminished number of guns. The *Edgar* fired a thousand 6-inch shells, while the *Wolverine* expended every round she carried.

Favoured by a quiet night, General Davies succeeded in embarking 2,300 men, nine guns and nearly a thousand animals on the night of the 7th/8th, and early next morning he was able

8 Jan. to report that his force now stood at just under 17,000,¹ and that
1916. he was ready, when ordered, to complete the final withdrawal.

The most critical stage of the plan had now been reached, and success or failure would largely depend upon a factor outside human control. Would the weather keep fine enough for the final stage to be carried through that night? The responsibility for ordering the operation to begin lay with the navy; and since many of the ships required were at Mudros, and would have to leave their anchorage soon after midday, an early decision was essential.

Admiral de Robeck, as he anxiously tried to solve the riddle of the sky, must surely have recalled that other occasion in April, when in vastly different circumstances he had pondered a similar problem.² Then, the harbour at Mudros was thronged with crowded transports; the air was alive with a confident spirit of victory; and 50,000 eager troops were waiting for the signal that was to launch them on the Great Adventure. Now, eight and a half months later, in the place of those earlier hopes, stood vain regret and bitter disillusionment. An enterprise rich with promise had been allowed to miscarry. The last act of the Gallipoli drama was drawing to its close, and all that remained to be done was to rescue from the general ruin as many as possible of the gallant men who were still clinging to their hard-won positions at the southern end of the peninsula.

The day was bright and calm with a gentle breeze from the south. The glass had fallen slightly, but the meteorological experts were of opinion that no change need be feared for the next 24 hours. In these circumstances de Robeck decided that prospects were reasonably favourable, and orders were thereupon issued for the final stage to begin.

The moon that night would set at a quarter past nine. This was an added advantage, for the Turks might well be counting that, as in the northern zone, evacuation would be delayed till the period of full moon.

Soon after dark that evening two long processions of shipping—one from Mudros and the other from Imbros—

¹ The troops left for the final stage consisted of :

Royal Artillery	700
13th Division	3,645
29th Division	4,145
52nd Division	2,845
R.N. Division	4,445
Base detachments, beach personnel, etc.	1,138
Total	<u>16,918</u>

² See Vol. I. p. 150.

began to approach for the last time the historic beaches at 8 Jan. Helles. Two old battleships, *Mars* and *Prince George*, were each to bring away 2,000 men. Six destroyers were to crowd 6,000 more on their long, narrow decks, 6,500 were to be packed into cross-Channel steamboats, and the balance of 500 were to be taken on board the cruiser *Talbot*. There was a small cargo boat for any guns or animals that could be saved, and two big hospital ships for the accommodation of wounded. Captain H. F. G. Talbot, R.N., was in naval charge, afloat, of the operation. 1916.

As a moderate swell might suffice to put a stop to the embarkation of men at Gully or X Beaches, and as the provision of any additional piers at those places might certainly warn the Turks that evacuation was imminent, it had already been decided that with the exception of the last 400 men of the 13th Division, who, with a number of beach personnel, would, if possible, embark at Gully Beach at the end of the operation, the whole force should be embarked in three echelons at W and V.

To enable the first echelon of troops—7,200 men—to remain in their existing positions till after dark, it had been arranged that the first batch of ships from W and V should not leave the beaches till 8 P.M. In order to allow for possible accidents to any of the boats, the second echelon was rather smaller than the first, and consisted of only 6,043 men. This echelon was to embark between 10.30 P.M. and 11.30 P.M., so that most of them, if all went well, would be safely away before the front-line trenches were vacated a quarter of an hour before midnight. The third echelon—numbering, with the troops to embark at Gully Beach, a total of 3,675, and comprising the last front-line troops, the garrisons of supporting posts and beach defences, the beach personnel, the embarkation staff and various parties of engineers, who were to stay to the end in case of damage to the piers—would embark between 2 and 3 A.M.

The corps commander and his staff would leave their headquarters as soon as the first echelon had got away, and embark about eight o'clock. The naval yacht *Triad* had been placed at General Davies's disposal for the night, and would remain off Helles, connected by submarine cable with the office of the G.O.C. Embarkation at corps headquarters and with Army Headquarters at Imbros.

Fifteen motor-lighters, with a few in reserve, were available for transferring the troops to the battleships and troop-carriers. Two lighters would be waiting at Gully Beach for the last troops of the 13th Division, and would take them thence to the

8 Jan. 1916. *Talbot*. For rescuing stragglers, or men who might lose their way, strings of cutters towed by destroyers were to lie off de Tott's Battery in the Straits and off Y Beach on the Aegean side of the peninsula.

A squadron of warships from Imbros, under the orders of Rear-Admiral S. Fremantle, was to approach the coast at night, ready, in case of necessity, to support the army by engaging the hostile guns.

Throughout the anxious hours of this last day on the peninsula the Turks were exceptionally quiet. There was even less than the usual amount of shelling, and it was with a feeling of quiet confidence that soon after dark the first echelon of troops began their silent march to the embarkation area.


But there still remained the incalculable hazard of the weather. About seven o'clock the breeze began to freshen. At the end of an hour it had stiffened very considerably, and though the first trip of lighters was loaded without much difficulty, the rapidly rising storm was already causing concern.

At nine o'clock the wind was blowing at 35 miles an hour, and its force was steadily increasing. Angry seas were pounding the frail piers. Two heavy lighters, breaking adrift, crashed into the flimsy floating bridge¹ on which so much depended, and the engineer party under Lieut. G. M. C. Taylor, working in black darkness with the waves dashing over them, were hard put to it to make the necessary repairs. Thanks to their efforts, however, the bridge was again made serviceable, and 3,000 men had safely passed over when two more lighters crashed into it and broke it so completely that further embarkations from the collier became impossible. In spite of these difficulties, however, and thanks to the seamanship, courage and resource of the naval personnel both afloat and ashore, the second echelon of troops was embarked well up to time, and all the 37 guns to be evacuated were safely got away. The superb handling of the troop-carriers, and the consummate skill which enabled the destroyers to be brought alongside the awkward hulks at W and V in pitch darkness and half a gale of wind, were worthy of the highest traditions of the Royal Navy, and won the admiration of all the troops who benefited by them.

¹ The bridge, made out of water tanks, metal drums and wooden casks of different sizes, had been extemporized by the 3rd Field Coy. Royal Naval Division. The company had also constructed long platforms on each side of the sunken collier from which the troops could go straight on board destroyers. At a rehearsal on the 7th it had been found that 1,000 men could pass over the bridge in an hour, and that 535 men in calm weather, could embark on a destroyer in 35 minutes.

THE EVACUATION OF HELLES.


Night 8th/9th January 1916.



Sketch 334

52ND DIVISION.

Arrangements for "Z" Day (8th January).



Prepared in the Historical Section (Military Branch)

Ordnance Survey 1931

Early in the evening an enemy submarine had been reported off Sedd el Bahr, and soon after midnight the disturbing news arrived at W Beach that the *Prince George*, which had just started for Mudros with 2,000 men on board, had been struck by a torpedo which had luckily failed to explode. Two destroyers were at once rushed to the spot, but there were no further alarms, and though the impact of the "torpedo" had been felt and heard by large numbers in the battleship, it is now known that no enemy submarine was present that night, and that the *Prince George* must have struck a piece of wreckage. 9 Jan. 1916.

Just before 2 A.M. the 13th Division at Gully Beach reported that its last party had embarked, and that the two lighters were about to push off. But twenty minutes later, when the W Beach programme was finishing, a further message arrived that one of the lighters was aground and could not be floated. Captain Staveley at once sent a reserve lighter to Gully Beach. But in the meantime General Maude, commanding the division, who had insisted on remaining with his rear party, had solved the problem for himself. The sea was now so rough that he felt there was little chance of another boat being able to approach the shore. So after filling the floating lighter with all the men it would carry, he started off with the remainder, 160 men in all, by the coast road to W Beach. The distance was two miles; and his front-line trenches had already been vacated for 2½ hours.

The swell at W Beach was becoming so heavy that the embarkation staff were now keenly anxious as to the possibility of embarking these men if their arrival were long delayed. At 2.40 A.M. a message was received that they would arrive in a quarter of an hour. Orders were thereupon issued for the small garrison of the beach defences to embark, and shortly afterwards General Lawrence closed his office at corps headquarters and withdrew to W Beach.

But the march from Gully Beach took longer than expected, for the road in many places had been s jammed with wire entanglements by the last troops to retire. By a quarter past three the majority of Maude's men had turned up. But Maude himself and his chief staff officer were still missing and did not arrive till twenty minutes later. Some distance from Gully Beach the general had discovered that his valise had been left on the stranded lighter, and he and his staff officer had gone back with a wheeled stretcher to find it.

By half past three the sea was running so high and the waiting boats were pounding so heavily against the crazy piers that it was only a matter of minutes before further embarkations

9 Jan. 1916: would be totally out of the question. But the end was now in sight. General Maude and his men were hurriedly pushed into the boats. The fuses to explode the main magazine were lighted, the huge dumps of abandoned stores and supplies were set on fire; and at 3.45 A.M. the last picket-boat left the shore and the evacuation was complete. "Here again", wrote Liman von Sanders, "the enemy was successful in his withdrawal in spite of all our watchfulness."

Since the orders to withdraw had arrived on the 28th December the total numbers evacuated without the knowledge of the enemy had amounted to 35,268 officers and men, 3,689 horses and mules, 127 guns, 328 vehicles and 1,600 tons of baggage and stores. Of grim necessity, 508 mules which could not be embarked were shot before departure. The abandoned stores and material included 1,590 vehicles, the majority of which had had their wheels destroyed. The loss of stores was undoubtedly very heavy; but as in the northern zone, and in far more difficult circumstances, the Turks and their German leaders had again been outwitted. Thanks to the splendid help of the navy, the admirable arrangements of the military commanders and staffs and the faultless co-operation of the regimental officers and men, the dread-d evacuation had been carried through without the loss of a life. Two other reasons for the absence of casualties were the strength of the resistance encountered by the Turks on the afternoon of the 7th, and the very stormy weather on the night of the 8th. The vigour of the counter-bombardment persuaded the Turks on the 7th that the British garrison was as strong as ever and that evacuation had not as yet begun. The storm on the final night persuaded them that in such weather the embarkation of troops was out of the question.

As the last lighters headed out to sea, the blazing stores on the beaches began to red-ten the sky, and the main magazine at Helles blew up with a thunderous roar. It was then realized by how narrow a margin the operation had ended without loss. At this first sign of evacuation the Turks sprang into activity. From the Asiatic shore, and from the whole Turkish line across the peninsula, hundreds of red rockets began to stab the darkness, and in immediate answer to this warning signal a violent bombardment was opened on the empty beaches and piers.

EPILOGUE

THE drama of the Dardanelles campaign, by reason of the beauty of its setting, the grandeur of its theme and the unhappiness of its ending, will always rank amongst the world's classic tragedies. The story is a record of lost opportunities and eventual failure; yet it is a story which men of British race may ponder if not without pain yet certainly not without pride; for amidst circumstances of unsurpassed difficulty and strain the bravery, fortitude and stoical endurance of the invading troops upheld most worthily the high traditions of the fighting services of the Crown.

To the student of military history the campaign offers the unusual advantage that, though it formed only a relatively small episode in the World War, its varied incidents stand out as one dramatic whole, with a beginning, a middle and an end; they facilitate to a remarkable degree the study of cause and effect, and point with unerring finger to the retribution which almost inevitably follows a neglect of age-old principles.

There is little doubt to-day that the idea of forcing the Straits with a view to helping Russia, eliminating Turkey from the war and rallying the Balkan States to the side of the Entente, was one of the few great strategical conceptions of the World War. There can be still less doubt that in the spring of 1915 the operation was not beyond the capacity of the Entente, and that a combined naval and military attack, carefully planned in every detail before the troops embarked, and carried out with the essential advantages of surprise, would have succeeded. Many reasons combined to frustrate an enterprise the success of which in 1915 would have altered the course of the war. But every reason will be found to spring from one fundamental cause—an utter lack of preparation before the campaign began.

Despite this fundamental folly, the first volume of this history has shown that twice during the early spring of 1915—at the naval attack on the 18th March and again at the April landings—the issue hung in the balance. But the naval attack was abandoned—never to be repeated—at the very moment

when the defenders were resigning themselves to defeat; and, in the case of the military attack, the absence of early preparation provoked inevitable penalties. After the long warnings given to the Turks the original Expeditionary Force was no longer strong enough to place success beyond peradventure. It was ill-supplied with drafts, guns and ammunition; and the initial operations furnished one more instance of the truth of the old maxim—that mistakes made in the original concentration can seldom, if ever, be rectified throughout the course of a campaign.

Britain's loss of these two opportunities is confirmed by the Turkish official account, and the sardonic comments of the Turkish compiler are of more than usual interest to British readers. Pointing out that Britain had the choice of two alternative methods of forcing the Straits—purely naval action or a combined naval and military attack—the writer proceeds: "The fact that the naval action was limited to only one attempt, on the 18th March, particularly merits reflection. To shrink from incurring insignificant losses is not the way to win big stakes. It is most probable that the objective could have been achieved by naval action alone had the attempt been pushed with greater vigour and repeated several times. To win big stakes one must not shrink from big risks, or even from risking all at a crisis. The second alternative was naturally preferable and more certain. But the way to do it was not as was actually done—to start with a small force and then reinforce it by dribblets. The probable requirements of the situation should have been most carefully worked out, and the necessary force decided on; sufficient strength should have been employed right from the very start." On a later page he adds that if at the outset Sir Ian Hamilton had been given six divisions instead of four, the invading troops "could have won a decisive success at the very beginning, for they might have forced the Straits before the defenders could bring up reinforcements, and thus influenced the political situation as regards Bulgaria and Rumania"

Nor was it only in the early part of the campaign that opportunities were missed. In the present volume, despite the inauspicious opening of the expedition, we have again seen the invading forces standing on the threshold of victory, and success missed by the narrowest of narrow margins. On the 7th August at Anzac the chance of capturing a key position on Chunuk Bair was lost by over-caution on the part of one column commander. At Suvla on the same morning golden opportunities were thrown away by inaction; and the two wasted days on that beach mark a vital turning-point in the history

of the World War. At Suvla on the morning of the 7th, twenty British battalions were opposed by a Turkish detachment of only fifteen hundred men. They were well placed to outflank the main Turkish forces already hotly engaged at Anzac; there were no Turkish reserves within a radius of thirty miles; and the British force had only to press forward to the empty ridge in front to make its position secure and to furnish that eagerly awaited support for the main battle which was the essence of the British plan. But it was not to be. The IX Corps found itself chained like Prometheus to the hills on the fringe of the bay, and the chance of victory disappeared, as it subsequently proved, for ever.

The story of Suvla, indeed, can be epitomized in seven lines from one of Shakespeare's most frequently quoted passages:

There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows and in miseries.
On such a full sea are we now afloat;
And we must take the current when it serves,
Or lose our ventures.

On such a full sea were the troops for Suvla carried on the night of the 6th August to the very gates of fortune. For the next two days they failed to take the current when it served, and so they lost their ventures. By daylight on the 9th the tide was on the turn, and from that moment the whole expedition, "bound in shallows and in miseries", began to be swept backwards to its eventual evacuation.

The direct causes of the Suvla failure have been discussed in detail in the body of this volume. The long delays in May and June, while the Government were deciding whether or not to continue the Gallipoli enterprise, had multiplied its inherent difficulties; and when, in August, the blow could at last be struck, the chances of success and failure were so evenly balanced that there was little margin for error. The excessive secrecy insisted upon by Sir Ian Hamilton had handicapped his plan by precluding the display of initiative by subordinate leaders. The chief command in the operation had been entrusted to a general without experience of high command in war.

Amongst other causes it has sometimes been urged that Sir Ian Hamilton himself had set an impossible task to his troops; but the narrow margin by which success was missed disproves this point of view. The task was undoubtedly hazardous, for Sir Ian Hamilton's army was scarcely equal in numbers to the total force at Liman's disposal, and a night landing by inexperi-

enced troops, followed by a night advance over unknown country, was as difficult an operation as has ever been undertaken. Yet success was certainly feasible. "The operations at Suvla", runs the final report of the Dardanelles Commission, "were a severe trial for a force consisting of troops who had never been under fire, but we think that, after taking into consideration and making every allowance for the difficulties of the attack and the inexperience of the troops, the attack was not pressed home as it should have been at Suvla on the 7th and 8th August." This view is upheld by Liman von Sanders and by the Turkish official account. "The British plan", writes the Turkish historian, "was well suited to the requirements of the situation. Had it been executed with resolution and energy, it would probably have effected very far-reaching results. The mastery of the Straits would have been definitely won, and the communications of the Turkish *Fifth Army* would have been cut."¹

Whether or not, after the failure at Anzac and Suvla, the prompt despatch of the reinforcements asked for by Sir Ian Hamilton on the 17th August would have enabled him to achieve his object must remain a matter of conjecture. It was then and later that the opposition of General Joffre was the main bar to an immediate and vigorous prosecution of the campaign. But it is certain that after the entry of Bulgaria into the war, the crushing of Serbia and the establishment of through communication between Germany and Constantinople, a complete British success at the Dardanelles, by which is meant not only the opening of the Straits but the occupation of the Turkish capital, had become a forlorn hope. In the appreciation drawn up at Imbros for Sir Charles Monro on the 28th October,² it was calculated that the Narrows forts could no longer be captured without an army of 250,000 men, that owing to the lateness of the season the attack could not be launched till the spring of 1916, and that the mere opening of the Straits could no longer be expected to bring Turkey to her knees. Constantinople, it suggested, would no longer be vacated at the mere threat of an attack, and Turkey could only be defeated by the destruction of her armed forces.

¹ The German naval history ("Der Krieg zur See 1914-18: Die Mittelmeer Division") shows that it was not only the Turkish land communications which were threatened in August; for in that month "the British submarines succeeded for the first time in raising the losses [amongst supply ships; all troops were at that time being sent by road] to a point that caused anxiety. If the destruction of tonnage had been maintained at anything like the same level during the next few months the resistance of the Fifth Army would have come to an end".

² See page 400.

In these circumstances, and in view of the obvious risks entailed by an attempt to remain on the peninsula throughout the winter months, there can be no doubt that by the middle of November there was no sane alternative to the policy of evacuation. Even if the fleet had succeeded in a single-handed effort to reach the Marmara that success would have been of small value unless followed up by immediate military action against the Turkish capital.

Yet, even after an evacuation which was more successful than anyone had dared to prophesy, a heavy penalty had still to be paid for the failure to solve the Turkish and Balkan problems in the spring of 1915. In the event of a decision to persevere with the campaign it had been calculated at Imbros in October that, including immediate reinforcements for the garrison, drafts to replace heavy winter wastage, and extra divisions for renewing the attack in the spring, the total numbers of troops required from England and France before the Narrows could be opened would be not far short of 400,000 men. The hope which underlay General Monro's recommendation of a withdrawal was that this heavy drain on the resources of the Allies would be stopped, and that Britain and France would thereby be enabled to exert their full power on the Western front. But this hope was not fulfilled. The failure of the August operations on the peninsula had led, as the result of French insistence, to the initiation of the Salonika enterprise. The evacuation of Gallipoli necessitated an increase of troops in Egypt to protect the Suez Canal. It happened, therefore, that on the 1st July 1916, when the Battle of the Somme opened, an Allied army of 237,000 men was chained to Salonika, whilst the garrison of Egypt exceeded 174,000. Thus, despite the abandonment of the peninsula, and to some extent by reason of it, the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean was still detaining an even larger force than 400,000 men from the main theatre of war.

A study of the actual numbers of troops sent out to Gallipoli in the course of the operations throws further light on the penalty paid for absence of preparation before the campaign started. In March 1915, when Sir Ian Hamilton was despatched at a day's notice, and without the semblance of a plan, "to assist the fleet to force the Dardanelles", the strength of his army was 75,000. One extra division in hand on the day of his first landing would probably have turned the scale. Yet by the end of the campaign, the total numbers that had been sent to the peninsula in a vain attempt to retrieve the initial error amounted to nearly

half a million.¹ Of this total 43,000 British officers and men had been killed, taken prisoner, or posted as missing, or had died of wounds or disease.² The total British casualties, including those evacuated sick, had amounted to 205,000;³ those of the French to 47,000. By a curious coincidence, the Turkish casualties are placed by the Turkish official account at the almost identical figure of 251,000; but Turkish records were very loosely kept, and other Turkish authorities place the total losses as high as 350,000.

Though the invading army believed that its footsteps were dogged by misfortune, the element of luck would seem on the whole to have been very evenly balanced throughout the operations. Both in April and in August the British landings were helped by perfect weather, while, at the time of the evacuations, the amazing fortune of two long spells of windless days and nights, at a moment when winter storms were seasonable, was largely responsible for the success of that difficult enterprise. But, when all is said and done, failure in war, as in any peace-time avocation, is far less often due to absence of luck than to a host of other causes. Chance, as a rule, will fight for the well-prepared, and though unexpected obstacles will usually arise in the path of the best-laid plan, success will fall to the side which has made the best provision to surmount them.

In examining the causes of British failure in Gallipoli, two important factors must not be overlooked—the splendid fighting qualities of the Turkish soldier in defence, and the brilliant leadership in the Turkish *Fifth Army*. At the outset of the campaign there was an unfortunate tendency to underestimate the Turk. It was wrongly imagined—principally as the result of certain incidents on the Syrian coast⁴—that his heart was not in the war against England, and that he would not fight with his traditional valour. No more dangerous miscalculation could have been made. In Gallipoli the Turkish soldier was actuated by two of the most powerful of human incentives—religious enthusiasm and the call to defend his country from foreign invasion. Though seldom excelling in attack, he clung to his positions with a grim courage which won the respect of

¹ 410,000 British and 79,000 French.

² "The Official History of the Great War, Medical Services: Casualties" and Medical Statistics."

³ 115,000 killed, missing and wounded; 90,000 evacuated sick. It must be noticed that, owing to the lack of hospital accommodation on the peninsula, large numbers were evacuated who were only suffering from light wounds or minor ailments.

⁴ See Vol. I. p. 53.

his adversaries, and throughout the campaign he proved himself, with few exceptions, a worthy and chivalrous opponent.

In one respect the Turk had a great advantage over the troops of the invading army. He was not a product of the town, but a peasant, accustomed to fend for himself and to find his way in difficult country by night as well as by day. He could thrive on simple fare, and conditions which entailed severe hardship upon the British troops were to him not greatly different to those of his peace-time existence.

In other respects the Turks were less fortunate. From the outset of the campaign their artillery ammunition was inferior in quality and quantity to that of the invader. Even when a factory was started at Constantinople there was not enough machinery or raw material for more than a small output, and the shells were of such poor quality that a high percentage would always fail to explode. As to warlike stores and equipment, Liman von Sanders wrote in his memoirs: "While the invaders had the resources of the world at their backs, the poor Turks were often constrained to capture from the British the indispensable tools for constructing field works. Sandbags were scarce, and when a supply did arrive, the troops would often use them to mend their tattered clothes. It was the admirable stoicism of the Anatolian soldier which enabled such difficulties to be overcome."¹

Marshal Liman von Sanders won high distinction in Gallipoli, and the Turks owed much to his bold and quick decisions. It was his definite order at the end of April, forbidding the voluntary surrender of a single yard of ground, which prevented the fall of Krithia and Achi Baba. Later, in August, his instantaneous decision to denude Bulair of troops, his speedy supersession of a lethargic corps commander, his dismissal of the German staff officer who counselled the abandonment of the southern zone—each and all had a vitally important effect on the course of the operations and marked him out as a born leader of men.

It would be impossible to appraise too highly the assistance which Liman von Sanders received from that "Man of Destiny" the present ruler of Turkey, who showed on the peninsula, at the head of an infantry division, an outstanding genius for command. It was that officer's ready grip of the situation on the 25th April which was primarily responsible for the failure of the Anzac corps to gain its objective on the first day of the landing. It was his vigorous action on the 9th August, when entrusted at a moment's notice with the command of the

¹ 'Fünf Jahre Türkei', pp. 97-8.

northern zone, that checked and defeated the long-delayed advance of the IX Corps. And, twenty-four hours later, following a personal reconnaissance, it was his brilliant counter-attack at Chunuk Bair which placed the Turks in undisputed possession of the main Sari Bair ridge. Seldom in history can the exertions of a single divisional commander have exercised, on three separate occasions, so profound an influence not only on the course of a battle, but perhaps on the fate of a campaign and even the destiny of a nation.

Few memories are sadder than the memory of lost opportunities, and few failures more poignant than those which, viewed in retrospect, were surely avoidable and ought to have been avoided. The story of the Dardanelles is a memory such as these. Yet, though the campaign failed in its main object, it was not an unredeemed failure, and the work on the peninsula in 1915 contributed largely to the eventual winning of the war. It was in great part due to the attack on the Straits that the Germans cancelled their heavy offensive in the West which they had planned for the spring of 1915, that Italy entered the war, that Greece remained neutral, and that Bulgaria held aloof till the result of the campaign seemed clear. The threat to Constantinople protected the Suez Canal and relieved the Russians from Turkish pressure in the Caucasus. Finally, it was the heavy fighting in Gallipoli that destroyed the flower of the Turkish army and prepared the way for Lord Allenby's victory in Palestine. These were solid advantages, even though they bear no comparison to the rich reward that awaited the capture of the Turkish capital. Truly may it be said that those who fell in Gallipoli did not fall in vain. In the words of Aeschylus, quoted at the beginning of this volume, "What need to repine at fortune's frowns? The gain hath the advantage, and the loss does not bear down the scale."

ORDER OF BATTLE

MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

AUGUST 1915

Commander-in-Chief . . .	Gen. Sir Ian Hamilton, G.C.B.
Chief of the General Staff . .	Major-Gen. W. P. Braithwaite, C.B.
Deputy Adjutant-General . .	Br.-Gen. E. M. Woodward.
Deputy Quartermaster-General .	Major-Gen. G. F. Ellison. ¹

VIII CORPS

G.O.C.	Lieut.-Gen. Sir F. I. Davies, K.C.B. ²
Br.-Gen., Gen. Staff	Br.-Gen. H. E. Street.

29TH DIVISION :

Major-Gen. H. de B. de Lisle, C.B.

86th Brigade:

2/Royal Fusiliers.	1/R. Munster Fusiliers.
1/Lancashire Fusiliers.	2/R. Dublin Fusiliers.

87th Brigade:

2/S. Wales Borderers.	1/R. Inniskilling Fusiliers.
1/K.O.S.B.	1/The Border Regiment.

88th Brigade:

4/Worcestershire Regt.	1/Essex Regt.
2/Hampshire Regt.,	1/5 th Royal Scots (T.F.).

XV Bde. R.H.A. (B, L & Y Btys.).

XVII Bde. R.F.A. (13th, 26th & 92nd Btys.).

CXLVII Bde. R.F.A. (10th, 97th & 368th Btys.). . . .

46th (Howitzer) Bty. R.F.A.

90th Heavy Bty. R.G.A.

14th Siege Bty. R.G.A.

¹ Succeeded Br.-Gen. S. H. Winter, 7th Aug.

² Replaced Major-Gen. W. Douglas, in temporary command, 8th Aug.

1/2nd London, 1/2nd Lowland & 1/1st W. Riding Field Coys. R.E.
(T.F.).
Divisional Cyclist Coy.

42ND (EAST LANCES.) DIVISION (T.F.):

Major-Gen. W. Douglas, C.B.¹

125th Brigade:

1/5th Lancashire Fus.	1/7th Lancashire Fus.
1/6th Lancashire Fus.	1/8th Lancashire Fus.

126th Brigade:

1/4th East Lancs. Regt.	1/9th Manchester Regt.
1/5th East Lancs. Regt.	1/10th Manchester Regt.

127th Brigade:

1/5th Manchester Regt.	1/7th Manchester Regt.
1/6th Manchester Regt.	1/8th Manchester Regt.

1/1st E. Lancs. Bde. R.F.A. (4th, 5th & 6th Btys.).²

1/2nd E. Lancs. Bde. R.F.A. (15th, 16th & 17th Btys.).³

1/3rd E. Lancs. Bde. R.F.A. (18th, 19th & 20th Btys.).⁴

1/4th E. Lancs. (How.) Bde. R.F.A. (1st & 2nd Cumberland Btys.).

1/1st E. Lancs., 1/2nd E. Lancs. & 1/2nd W. Lancs.⁵ Field Coys. R.E.

52ND (LOWLAND) DIVISION (T.F.):

Major-Gen. G. G. A. Egerton, C.B.

155th Brigade:

1/4th R. Scots Fus.	1/4th K.O.S.B.
1/5th R. Scots Fus.	1/5th K.O.S.B.

156th Brigade:

1/4th Royal Scots.	1/7th Scottish Rifles.
1/7th Royal Scots.	1/8th Scottish Rifles.

157th Brigade:

1/5th Highland L.I.	1/7th Highland L.I.
1/6th Highland L.I.	1/5th Arg. & Suth'd Highrs.

1/2nd Lowland Bde. R.F.A.⁶

1/4th Lowland (How.) Bde. R.F.A. (1/4th & 1/5th City of Glasgow Btys.).

2/1st and 2/2nd Lowland Field Coys. R.E.

Divisional Cyclist Coy.

¹ Resumed command from Br.-Gen. W. R. Marshall, 8th Aug.

² 4th Bty. and 1 section 6th Bty. did not arrive from Egypt until Sept.

³ In Egypt.

⁴ 19th & 20th Btys. did not arrive from Egypt until Sept.

⁵ Attached 52nd Div. till 28th Aug.

AUGUST ORDER OF BATTLE

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ROYAL NAVAL DIVISION : Major-Gen. A. Paris, C.B.,

1st Brigade:

Drake Bn.	Hawke Bn.
Nelson Bn.	Hood Bn.

2nd Brigade:

No. 1 Bn. R.M.L.I.	Howe Bn.
No. 2 Bn. R.M.L.I.	Anson Bn. ¹

1st, 2nd & 3rd Field Coys Engineers.
Divisional Cyclist Coy.

IX CORPS

G.O.C. Lieut.-Gen. Hon. Sir F. W.
Stopford, K.C.M.G.
Br.-Gen., Gen. Staff Br.-Gen. H. L. Reed, V.C.

10TH (IRISH) DIVISION : Lieut.-Gen. Sir B. T. Mahon, K.C.V.O.

29th Brigade:²

10/Hampshire Regt.	5/Connaught Rangers.
6/R. Irish Rifles.	6/Leinster Regt.

30th Brigade:

6/R. Munster Fus.	6/R. Dublin Fus.
7/R. Munster Fus.	7/R. Dublin Fus.

31st Brigade:

5/R. Inniskilling Fus.	5/R. Irish Fus.
6/R. Inniskilling Fus.	6/R. Irish Fus.

5/R. Irish Regt. (Pioneers).

LIV Bde. R.F.A. (A, B, C & D Btys.).³

LV Bde. R.F.A. (A, B, C & D Btys.).⁴

LVI Bde. R.F.A. (A, B, C & D Btys.).⁵

LVII (Howitzer) Bde. (H.Q. with A & D Btys, only).

65th, 66th and 85th Field Coys. R.E.

Divisional Cyclist Coy.

¹ On beach duties at Suvla.

² Attached A. & N.Z. Corps.

³ Did not come further than Mudros. Eventually went to Salonika.

⁴ A & C Btys. did not arrive from Egypt until Sept.

⁵ At Helles. A & B Btys. did not arrive from Egypt until Oct.

11TH (NORTHERN) DIVISION :
Major-Gen. F. Hammersley, C.B.

32nd Brigade:

9/West Yorks Regt.	8/West Riding Regt.
6/Yorkshire Regt.	6/York & Lanc. Regt.

33rd Brigade:

6/Lincolnshire Regt.	7/S. Staffordshire Regt.
6/The Border Regt.	9/Sturwood Foresters.

34th Brigade:

8/Northumberland Fins.	5/Dorsetshire Regt.
9/Lancashire Fus.	11/Manchester Regt.

6/East Yorkshire Regt. (Pioneers).
LVIII Bde. R.F.A. (A, B, C & D Btys.).
LIX Bde. R.F.A. (A, B, C & D Btys.).
LX Bde. R.F.A. (A, B, C & D Btys.).¹
67th, 68th & 86th Field Coys. R.E.
Divisional Cyclist Coy.

13TH (WESTERN) DIVISION : ²
Major-Gen. F. C. Shaw, C.B.

38th Brigade:

6/King's Own.	6/South Lancs. Regt.
6/East Lancs. Regt.	6/Loyal N. Lancs. Regt.

39th Brigade:

9/R. Warwickshire Regt.	9/Worcestershire Regt.
7/Gloucestershire Regt.	7/N. Staffordshire Regt.

40th Brigade:

4/S. Wales Borderers.	8/Cheshire Regt.
8/R. Welch Fus.	5/Wiltshire Regt.

8/Welch Regt. (Pioneers).
LXVI Bde. R.F.A. (A, B, C & D Btys.).³
LXVII Bde. R.F.A. (A, B, C & D Btys.).¹
LXVIII Bde. R.F.A. (A, B, C & D Btys.).¹
LXIX (Howitzer) Bde. R.F.A. (A, B, C & D Btys.).⁴
71st, 72nd and 88th Field Coys. R.E.
Divisional Cyclist Coy.

¹ In Egypt. Eventually sent to Salonika.

² Attached A. & N.Z. Corps.

³ At Helles.

⁴ At Anzac.

AUGUST ORDER OF BATTLE

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CORPS TROOPS :

4th (Highland) Mountain Artillery Bde. (T.F.) :
Argyllshire Bty. and Ross & Cromarty Bty.

ATTACHED IN CORPS

53RD (WELSH) DIVISION (T.F.) :

Maj.-Gen. Hon. J. E. Lindley.¹

158th Brigade:

1/5th R. Welch Fus.	1/7th R. Welch Fus.
1/6th R. Welch Fus.	1/1st Herefordshire Regt.

159th Brigade:

1/4th Cheshire Regt.	1/4th Welch Regt.
1/7th Cheshire Regt.	1/5th Welch Regt.

160th Brigade:

2/4th Queen's (R.W. Surrey Regt.).	2/4th R.W. Kent Regt.
1/4th R. Sussex Regt.	2/10th Middlesex Regt.

1/1st Welsh & 2/1st Cheshire Field Coys. R.E.
Divisional Cyclist Coy

54TH (EAST ANGLIAN) DIVISION (T.F.) :

Major-Gen. F. S. Inglefield, C.B.

161st Brigade:

1/4th Essex Regt.	1/6th Essex Regt.
1/5th Essex Regt.	1/7th Essex Regt.

162nd Brigade:

1/5th Bedfordshire Regt.	1/10th London Regt.
1/4th Northamptonshire Regt.	1/11th London Regt.

163rd Brigade:

1/4th Norfolk Regt.	1/5th Suffolk Regt.
1/5th Norfolk Regt.	1/8th Hampshire Regt.

1/2nd & 2/1st East Anglian Field Coys. R.E.
Divisional Cyclist Coy.

¹ Succeeded by Br.-Gen. Hon. H. A. Lawrence 19th Aug. Br.-Gen. W. R. Marshall took command 25th Aug.

GALLIPOLI

2ND MOUNTED DIVISION : ¹

Major-Gen. W. E. Peyton, C.B.

1st (S. Midland) Bde.:

1/1st Warwickshire Yeo.	1/1st Worcestershire Yeo.
1/1st R. Gloucestershire Hussars.	

2nd (S. Midland) Bde.:

1/1st Royal Bucks Hussars.	1/1st Berkshire Yeo.
1/1st Dorset Yeo.	

3rd (Notts. & Derby) Bde.:

1/1st Sherwood Rangers.	1/1st Derbyshire Yeo.
1/1st S. Notts Hussars.	

4th (London) Bde.:

1/1st County of London Yeo.	1/3rd County of London Yeo.
1/1st City of London Yeo.	

5th Brigade : ²

1/1st Hertfordshire Yeo.	1/2nd County of London Yeo. (Westminster Dns.).
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AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND ARMY CORPS

G.O.C.	Lieut.-Gen. Sir W. R. Birdwood, K.C.S.I.
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Br.-Gen., Gen. Staff	Br.-Gen. A. Skeen.
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1ST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION :

Major-Gen. H. B. Walker, D.S.O.

1st Australian Brigade:

1st (N.S.W.) Bn.	3rd (N.S.W.) Bn.
2nd (N.S.W.) Bn.	4th (N.S.W.) Bn.

2nd Australian Brigade:

5th (Victoria) Bn.	7th (Victoria) Bn.
6th (Victoria) Bn.	8th (Victoria) Bn.

3rd Australian Brigade:

9th (Queensland) Bn.	11th (W. Australia) Bn.
10th (S. Australia) Bn.	12th (S. & W. Austr. and Tas- mania) Bn.

I. (N.S.W.) F.A. Bde. (1st, 2nd & 3rd Btys.).

II. (Victoria) F.A. Bde. (4th, 5th & 6th Btys.).

III. F.A. Bde.: 7th (Queensland), 8th (W. Austr.) & 9th (Tasmania)
Btys.

1st, 2nd & 3rd Field Coys. Australian Engineers.

4th (Victoria) Light Horse Regt.¹¹ Dismounted.² Attached.

NEW ZEALAND & AUSTRALIAN DIVISION :

Major-Gen. Sir A. J. Godley, K.C.M.G.

New Zealand Brigade:

Auckland Bn.

Otago Bn.

Canterbury Bn.

Wellington Bn.

4th Australian Brigade:

13th (N.S.W.) Bn.

15th (Queensland & Tas.) Bn.

14th (Victoria) Bn.

16th (S. & W. Austr.) Bn.

New Zealand Mounted Rifles Bde.:¹

Auckland Mtd. Rifles.

Wellington Mtd. Rifles.

Canterbury Mtd. Rifles.

1st Australian Light Horse Bde.:¹

1st (N.S.W.) Regt.

3rd (S. Austr. & Tas.) Regt.

2nd (Queensland) Regt.

Maori Detachment.

I. N.Z.F.A. Bde. (1st & 3rd Btys. & 6th How. Bty.).²II. N.Z.F.A. Bde. (2nd & 5th Btys. & 4th How. Bty.).²

1st & 2nd Field Coys. N.Z. Engineers.

N.Z. Field Troop, Engineers.

Otago Mtd. Rifles.¹2ND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION : ³

Major-Gen. J. G. Legge.

5th Australian Brigade:

17th (N.S.W.) Bn.

19th (N.S.W.) Bn.

18th (N.S.W.) Bn.

20th (N.S.W.) Bn.

6th Australian Brigade:

21st (Victoria) Bn.

23rd (Victoria) Bn.

22nd (Victoria) Bn.

24th (Victoria) Bn.

7th Australian Brigade:

25th (Queensland) Bn.

27th (S. Australia) Bn.

26th (Queensland & Tas.) Bn.

28th (W. Australia) Bn.

4th & 5th Field Coys. Australian Engineers.

13th (Victoria) Light Horse Regt.¹¹ Dismounted.² H.Q. 2nd Bde. and 6th (How.) Bty. did not arrive from Egypt till October. N.Z. artillery was then organized in 2 brigades.³ Only 5th Austr. Bde. present on peninsula in Aug. Remainder arrived from Egypt early in Sept.

GALLIPOLI

CORPS TROOPS.

2nd Australian Light Horse Bde.:¹

5th (Queensland) Regt. 7th (N.S.W.) Regt.
6th (N.S.W.) Regt.

3rd Australian Light Horse Bde.:¹

8th (Victoria) Regt. 10th (W. Austr.) Regt.
9th (Vic. & S. Austr.) Regt.

7th Indian Mountain Artillery Bde.:²

1 4.7-inch Gun. 3 6-inch howitzers.

ATTACHED NEW ZEALAND & AUSTRALIAN DIVISION:

29th Indian Infantry Brigade: Major-Gen. H. V. Cox.

14th Sikhs. 1/6th Gurkha Rifles.
1/5th Gurkha Rifles. 2/10th Gurkha Rifles.

G.H.Q. TROOPS

20TH BRIGADE R.G.A.:

10th, 15th & 91st Heavy Btys. R.G.A.

24TH BRIGADE R.G.A.:³

17th, 42nd & 43rd Siege Btys. R.G.A.

ARMoured CAR DIVISION (R.N.A.S.):

Nos. 3,³ 4,³ 9, 10, 11 & 12³ Squadrons.

CORPS EXPÉDITIONNAIRE D'ORIENT

Commander General Bailloud.

1ST DIVISION: Gen. Brulard.

1st Metropolitan Brigade:

175th Regiment.
1st Regt. de marche d'Afrique (2 Bns. Zouaves, 1 Bn. Foreign Legion).
Foreign Legion Battalion (2 Coys.).

2nd Colonial Brigade:

4th Colonial Regiment.
6th Colonial Regiment.

6 Batteries of Artillery (75-mm.).

2 Batteries of Artillery (65-mm.).

¹ Dismounted.

² 21st (Kohat) Bty. and 26th (Jacob's) Bty.

³ In Egypt.

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2ND DIVISION :

3rd Metropolitan Brigade:

176th Regiment.

2nd Regt. de marche d'Afrique (3 Bns. Zouaves).

4th Colonial Brigade:

7th Colonial Regiment.

8th Colonial Regiment.

9 Batteries of Artillery (75-mm.).

CORPS ARTILLERY :

1 Heavy Battery, 120-mm. long (4.7-inch).

1 Heavy Battery, 155-mm. long } (6-inch).

2 Heavy Batteries, 155-mm. short }

2 Siege guns, 240-mm. (9.4-inch).

Battery of naval guns.

PRINCIPAL BOOKS CONSULTED

OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS

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Vols. I. and II., by C. E. W. Bean. Angus & Robertson, Ltd.,
Sydney.
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with the Gallipoli campaign.
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"Vol. I., La Campagne d'Orient (Dardanelles et Salonique)."
Imprimerie Nationale, Paris.
- "Der Kampf um die Dardanellen 1915", by Dr. Carl Muhlmann, in
the "Schlachten des Weltkrieges" series of monographs.
- "Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, Die militärischen Operationen zu
"Lande." Vol. VII. Mittler & Sons, Berlin.
- "Der Krieg zur See 1914-18: Die Mittel-meer Division."
Mittler & Sons, Berlin.
- "Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch 1914" collected
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Whitcomb & Tombs, Auckland, Christchurch, etc.
- "A Short History of Turkish Operations in the Great War", pub-
lished by the Historical Section, General Staff, Constantinople.
Vol. I. deals with the Gallipoli campaign.

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- MILITARY OPERATIONS, FRANCE AND BELGIUM 1915, Vols. I. and II.,
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- NAVAL OPERATIONS, Vols. II. and III., by Sir Julian S. Corbett.
- MEDICAL SERVICES: CASUALTIES & MEDICAL STATISTICS OF THE
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- HAMILTON : "Gallipoli Diary", Vols. I. and II., by General Sir Ian Hamilton. Edward Arnold.
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- LIMAN : "Fünf Jahre Türkei", by General der Kavallerie Liman von Sanders. Scherl, Berlin.
- NEVINSON : "The Dardanelles Campaign", by Henry W. Nevinston. Nisbet & Co.
- POINCARÉ : "The Memoirs of Raymond Poincaré 1915." His fourth volume, translated and adapted by Sir George Arthur. Wm. Heinemann.
- ROBERTSON : "Soldiers and Statesmen 1914-1918", by Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, Bt. Cassell & Co.
- THOMAZI : "La Guerre navale aux Dardanelles", by A. Thomazi. Payot, Paris.
- TIRPITZ : "Erinnerungen", by Alfred von Tirpitz. Koehler, Leipzig.
- WESTER-WEMYSS : "The Navy in the Dardanelles Campaign", by Admiral of the Fleet Lord Wester-Wemyss. Hodder & Stoughton.